

# EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

## HONORING COMMUNITY VETERANS

### HON. NYDIA M. VELÁZQUEZ

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, January 27, 2003

Ms. VELÁZQUEZ. Mr. Speaker, I rise today as the 3-year observance of the 50th anniversary of the Korean war comes to a close.

It is with great pride that I honor the men that served in the Armed Forces of the United States of America during that time and are members of the St. Stanislaus Memorial Post No. 1771 American Legion, Brooklyn, NY.

Since their honorable discharge from the armed services, they have led productive lives and continued to serve their communities, State, and Nation.

Therefore, it is with much honor and appreciation that I salute these brave men: Feldele Aita, Joseph Angerome, John Astrab, Joseph Beneventin, Walter Bielski, Edward Bizinski, Charles Bond, John Borisuck, Nicholas Burdick, Kevin Cahill, James Campion, John Canderloro, Michael Cantelmi, Michael Chorney, Anthony Chorney, Michael Croccia, Edward Czartoryski, Edward Danielski, Joseph Darragh, Everett Deming, Edward Dempsey, Donald Denson, Justin Dudzinski, Vincent Dzirko, Rudolph Fafalak, Louis Franklin, and Sol Friedman.

Michael Garvey, Ralph Gatti, Roman Giblewski, George Gibney, Dan Goodman, Eugene Graboski, John Graham, Richard Haines, Gerard Hammond, Lee Hedberg, George Heiberg, James Hesse, John Hoffmann, John Jablonski, William Janovesik, John Karcinsky, Robert Kelly, Thomas Knapp, Joseph Konzelman, Martin Kost, Walter Kryshak, Daniel Kujawa, Saverio La Rocca, Louis Lasecki, Edward Lentol, Carl Licht, Joseph Lukasiewicz, Bernard Maciejewski, Anthony Mangone, William Martin, Henry McQuillan, Frank Moley, Frank Paterno, Vincent Petitto, Robert Pieprzak, Peter Rago, William Revy, Roosevelt Rhodes, Henry Rusielewicz, Philip Ryzkiewicz, Louis Sieber, Walter Sito, George Skaats, Thomas Skubin, Charles Smith, Raymond Smith, Edward Spaeth, Fred Stiith, Leonard Suligowski, Peter Sullivan, Jean Taylor, Nicholas Teta, Henry Tomaszewski, John Walsh, and Alfred Willett.

## PERSONAL EXPLANATION

### HON. FRANK W. BALLANCE, JR.

OF NORTH CAROLINA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, January 27, 2003

Mr. BALLANCE. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 12, Congratulating the Ohio State University for winning the 2002 NCAA Division I football championship, I was regrettably unable to cast my vote at the appropriate time. Had I been present, I would have voted "yea."

## THREATS AND RESPONSES: TRACKING TERRORISM; 9/11 REPORT SAYS SAUDI ARABIA LINKS WENT UNEXAMINED

### HON. MARCY KAPTUR

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, January 27, 2003

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, I submit the following for the RECORD.

(By David Johnston and James Risen)

A draft report by the joint Congressional committee looking into the Sept. 11 attacks has concluded that the F.B.I. and the C.I.A., in their investigations, did not aggressively pursue leads that might have linked the terrorists to Saudi Arabia, senior government officials said today.

The report charged among other things that the authorities had failed to investigate the possibility that two of the hijackers, Saudis named Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, received Saudi money from two Saudi men they met with in California in the year before the attacks. The committee's preliminary findings, which also accuse the Saudi government of a lack of cooperation with American investigators, have caused a bitter behind-the-scenes dispute between the panel's staff and officials at the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. At each agency, officials have disagreed with draft findings, saying investigators vigorously pursued all available information related to Saudi Arabia.

Fifteen of the 19 hijackers were Saudi citizens, but little is known about their backgrounds and how they were recruited for the attacks. Most of the Saudis were part of a group that investigators refer to as the "muscle." These were men recruited late in the planning for the operation, not as pilots, but as an unskilled security force for the hijacking operation. Their job was to keep passengers at bay as the planes were commandeered and flown to their intended targets.

In a rebuttal report sent to the committee in recent days, the F.B.I. has tried to disprove several specific allegations by the committee. One of them was about Mr. Midhar and Mr. Alhazmi, who lived in San Diego a year before the attacks.

While in California, the two met with Omar al-Bayoumi and Osama Bassnan, each of whom was receiving financial support from the Saudi government. The men were receiving stipends, although officials said it was not exactly clear what kind. The committee staff concluded in its draft findings that investigators should have followed up on the meetings of the four men to determine whether there might have been a Saudi link to the hijacking plot.

The F.B.I. is still investigating how much financial support, if any, was provided by Mr. Bayoumi and Mr. Bassnan to the two men who later turned out to be hijackers. The bureau is also looking into whether senior Saudi officials in the United States may have played some role in distributing funds to Mr. Bayoumi and Mr. Bassnan.

Today, the F.B.I. said in a statement that it had "aggressively pursued investigative leads regarding terrorist support and activity." It added that Mr. Bayoumi and Mr.

Bassnan had both been charged with visa fraud after the attacks.

But by that time, Mr. Bayoumi was already in Britain, where he was temporarily detained and then released because visa fraud was not an extraditable offense. The F.B.I. statement did not say where the two men were now or clarify the status of the cases against them.

Although the disagreement has not been publicly disclosed until now, the debate over possible Saudi connections raises a very sensitive political issue for the Bush administration. Saudi Arabia is the largest oil producer in the world and one of the United States' closest and most important allies in the Persian Gulf at a time when the administration is preparing for a possible war with Iraq.

In its report to the committee, the F.B.I. said that it was no uncommon for Saudis in the United States to receive financial support from their government and that an inquiry into the two men after the attacks had failed to produce evidence that they had any link to the Sept. 11 plot. A C.I.A. spokesman declined to comment about the joint inquiry's investigation of the Saudi matter.

Counterterrorism officials have said Mr. Midhar and Mr. Alhazmi had paid for more of their expenses with cash, which has made the investigation more difficult. They have also denied finding any evidence that funds for the attacks were channeled through Saudi Arabia or that the Riyadh government had any connection to the hijackers.

It remains unclear whether the draft conclusions about Saudi Arabia will be included in the joint committee's final report, which is to be completed in December in classified form. An edited version is not expected to be made public until next year, officials said.

The Bush administration has sought to maintain close ties with Riyadh even as investigators examining the backgrounds of the hijackers have complained that they have received little cooperation from the Saudi government.

Investigators have yet to determine how the Saudi hijackers were selected for the plot, who chose them or whether they had help inside Saudi Arabia. Some American officials have theorized that Mr. Midhar and Mr. Alhazmi may have returned to Saudi Arabia from the United States to pick the Saudi hijackers, but investigators have no firm conclusions.

For their part, Saudi officials have said that they have assisted in important aspects of the investigation—for instance, providing confirmation of the identities of the Saudi hijackers. The officials have also said the hijackers' anti-American extremism did not represent mainstream thinking in the kingdom, even though some American officials have long regarded Islamic militancy as a serious problem that could destabilize the authoritarian government.

The tension between the joint inquiry staff and the F.B.I. and C.I.A. is the latest to evolve from the inquiry into lapses by intelligence and law enforcement agencies related to the Sept. 11 attacks. In a series of interim reports released during committee hearings in recent months, the joint panel had repeatedly criticized the performance of the two agencies.

Those sometimes scathing reports prompted officials at both the F.B.I. and the C.I.A.,

• This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by a Member of the Senate on the floor.

Matter set in this typeface indicates words inserted or appended, rather than spoken, by a Member of the House on the floor.